In H.N. v School District No. 61 (Greater Victoria), 2025 BCCA 144, the British Columbia Court of Appeal upheld a trial decision dismissing a claim that the Greater Victoria School District should be vicariously liable for sexual abuse committed by a volunteer tutor, Gary Redgate, against a Grade 6 student, hereinafter referred to as “HN”.

The facts were largely undisputed. HN’s teacher arranged for Redgate, a recently retired teacher, to provide weekly 40-minute tutoring sessions in an empty classroom during English class to assist HN with writing a novel. The classroom door remained open at all times, and the room was located near the secretary’s office. During the sessions, Redgate and HN initially sat on opposite sides of a table; however, over time, Redgate moved closer to HN, at times close enough for their arms to touch. HN also recalled one occasion when Redgate hugged him at school during a special event. The tutoring continued throughout the school year and concluded when HN completed Grade 6 in June 2000.

Visits progressed to Redgate’s home beginning in March 2000, initially for HN to complete yard work. Over time, these visits became more frequent, totaling approximately 50 visits over a five-year period. The visits were not authorized, organized, or facilitated by the school, and HN’s parents were aware of them. After HN completed Grade 6, the two met exclusively at Redgate’s home, as the novel was largely finished. Redgate was adamant that their relationship continue; accordingly, HN would visit to play cards, watch movies, and occasionally work on other projects.

After the publication of HN’s novel in December 2000, and because the novel was complete, Redgate began telling HN that he would have nothing to live for and made threats to take his own life. He also began recounting sexual experiences to HN and expressing romantic feelings. This escalated to hugging HN goodbye and, later, to lingering kisses on the lips. Over time, the interactions became increasingly sexual.Justice Harris found that Redgate’s voluntary tutoring relationship provided the opportunity to meet and begin manipulating HN, but that the abuse was not sufficiently connected to any authority, power, or intimacy conferred by the school. The Supreme Court of British Columbia concluded that this was a case of “mere opportunity,” not one in which the school’s enterprise materially increased the risk of abuse.

On appeal, HN argued that the trial judge had misapplied Jacobi[1], failed to appreciate the significance of the grooming evidence, and overlooked the private nature of one-on-one tutoring as compared to the public recreation programs discussed in Jacobi. The Court of Appeal unanimously rejected these arguments. It accepted that the tutoring arrangement provided Redgate with the opportunity to begin grooming HN, and that, but for that opportunity, the abuse would not have occurred. However, the Court emphasized that mere opportunity does not establish the “strong connection” required for vicarious liability. The appeal was dismissed.

The Significance of the Supreme Court of Canada’s Leave Decision

The Supreme Court of Canada has granted leave to appeal this decision, suggesting that further guidance is forthcoming. It is anticipated that the Court will revisit how prior jurisprudence, including Bazley[2] and Jacobi, applies in modern contexts, particularly in light of the current understanding of grooming behaviours and evolving notions of institutional responsibility, where volunteers or employees may interact with minors outside formal supervision.

There are two key reasons this matters for the broader legal landscape. First, we can expect clarification of the “strong connection” standard. The “enterprise risk” approach turns on whether an institution’s structure, assigned duties, or level of supervision materially enhances the risk of abuse. By granting leave, the Supreme Court of Canada signals a potential refinement of this test, particularly as it applies to part-time, volunteer, or remote relationships that arise through an institutional connection.

Second, we can anticipate a modernization of vicarious liability that accounts for grooming and social context. While Bazley and Jacobi were decided in 1999, the understanding of grooming, trust-building, and authority dynamics in abuse cases has evolved significantly in the intervening years. A key question is whether the “mere opportunity” threshold adequately captures these dynamics, or whether institutions that create access through formal, on-site arrangements, despite off-site interactions outside the parties’ contemplation may nonetheless face exposure for abuse occurring beyond the premises and outside the formal scope of the relationship.

From an insurer’s perspective, the outcome of this appeal could materially affect risk exposure and policy interpretation.

If the Supreme Court expands the interpretation of “strong connection” to include institutional facilitation or initial introductions that later lead to abuse, the scope of institutional responsibility will broaden and liability exposure for insured entities will increase. This could include volunteers, contractors, and third‑party mentors whose relationships originate in an institutional setting, even if the abuse occurs privately or long after formal contact ends.

The case also has underwriting and risk management implications: it underscores the importance of explicit vetting, supervision, and boundary policies for volunteers who interact with minors. Even if current law limits liability to cases of a “strong connection,” any expansion by the Supreme Court would heighten the relevance of institutional policies and training from a loss‑prevention standpoint.

Interprovincial relevance is clear: although this case arises out of British Columbia, the principles are well established in Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence and applies nationwide. Institutions and insurers should therefore monitor this appeal closely, as the Court’s decision will shape the national threshold for the “strong connection” standard and vicarious liability in abuse claims.

Looking Ahead

The appeal in H.N. v School District No. 61 (Greater Victoria) will give the Supreme Court of Canada an opportunity to modernize or reaffirm a basis of Canadian tort law regarding vicarious liability. Whether the Court strengthens or softens the “mere opportunity” boundary in recognition of grooming dynamics, the Court’s ruling will directly influence how insurers assess risk, set coverage pricing, and defend institutions accused of vicarious liability for abuse.

For insurers, this is more than a British Columbia case; it is a potential reset of how lines are drawn between institutional opportunity and institutional responsibility across Canada.

[1] Jacobi v Griffiths, 1999 CanLII 693 (SCC), [1999] 2 SCR 570.

[2] Bazley v Curry, Bazley v. Curry, 1999 CanLII 692 (SCC), [1999] 2 SCR 534.